The security of an apartment building’s access control is not determined by the intercom panel on the wall. It is determined by the credential in the resident’s pocket—and by the generation of technology that credential belongs to.
A video intercom system with a 1080p camera, face recognition, and a hardened outdoor station can still be defeated by a credential that broadcasts a fixed number in the clear. This is not a theoretical concern. The access control industry has spent nearly two decades living with the consequences of deploying credentials that were compromised before many of them were installed, and the pattern continues in the 2025–2026 deployment cycle: legacy cards remain in circulation, hardware backdoors have been discovered in widely used chips, and relay attacks can now defeat proximity assumptions without ever cloning a card.
For distributors, integrators, and property developers, the practical question is not “is RFID secure?” It is: which credential technology is being deployed, what attack does it resist, and what happens when it is compromised? This guide separates the credential generations, examines the specific cloning and relay mechanisms that matter in apartment and villa deployments, and provides a migration and hardening framework.
The Credential Generations: A Security Divide, Not a Spectrum
Access credentials fall into distinct generations, and the security gap between them is categorical rather than incremental.
Generation 1: 125 kHz Proximity Cards — Trivially Clonable
125 kHz low-frequency (LF) cards broadcast a fixed ID number without encryption. There is no authentication step: the reader receives the number and checks whether it is authorized. Anyone who knows the number can be that card.
The security assessment from Gallagher’s credential guidance is unambiguous: 125 kHz cards are classified as “No knowledge required (trivially clonable)” and are not recommended for new sites. Cloning takes seconds with inexpensive hardware, and the tools are widely available. One industry guide states directly: “Cheap hardware clones these cards in seconds. Avoid the technology in any situation where security is required”.
In a 2024 survey cited by HID Global, one in three companies still supported 125 kHz proximity cards. This is the largest single population of vulnerable credentials in the installed base.
Generation 2: MIFARE Classic — Compromised in 2008, Still Deployed
MIFARE Classic introduced sector-based memory and the Crypto-1 cipher, which represented a meaningful advance over fixed-ID cards. But Crypto-1 was cryptographically broken, and the practical consequence is that MIFARE Classic cards can be cloned reliably with commodity tools.
The cloning timeline is measured in seconds to minutes, not hours:
- Darkside/nested authentication attack: 10–30 seconds with a Proxmark3 costing approximately $20.
- Hardnested attack: under 5 minutes.
- Average clone time for a MIFARE Classic 1K card: approximately 6 minutes; for a 4K card, approximately 15 minutes.
Gallagher’s guidance states that MIFARE Classic was compromised in 2008, that free Android apps can clone Classic credentials in seconds using published key lists, and that reports of real-world cloning incidents are increasing.
The 2025–2026 CVE record confirms the ongoing impact. CVE-2025-4053 describes a Be-Tech hotel MIFARE Classic system in which card data is stored in cleartext, allowing an attacker with access to a single guest card to create a master key card that unlocks all the locks in the building. The remediation is not a firmware patch—it requires replacing the software, encoder, cards, and PCBs.
A further complication emerged in 2024: Quarkslab researchers disclosed an undocumented hardware backdoor in certain MIFARE Classic-compatible chips, including the Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics FM11RF08S, allowing authentication with an unknown key and instantaneous cloning. These chips are used in office and hotel access cards globally, including in the US, Europe, and India.
Generation 3: MIFARE DESFire EV2/EV3 — Cryptographically Hardened
DESFire EV2 and EV3 represent the current secure baseline for contactless access credentials. The technical differences from Classic are fundamental:
| Feature | MIFARE Classic | MIFARE DESFire EV2/EV3 |
|---|---|---|
| Cipher | Crypto-1 (broken) | 3DES / AES-128 (EV2); AES-128 (EV3) |
| Mutual authentication | No — the card cannot verify the reader | Yes |
| Cloneability | Trivial with commodity tools | Cryptographically infeasible with correct key management |
DESFire EV3 adds AES-128 encryption, mutual authentication, and a secure channel for protecting card data from man-in-the-middle attacks, with card-specific keys bound to specific applications. Cloning is described as “computationally infeasible” when the card is configured correctly.
The critical qualifier is “when configured correctly.” DESFire’s security depends on key management. Gallagher’s guidance recommends that sites not use the default DESFire key and should use site-specific keys generated at install. A DESFire deployment using default keys is not a secure deployment.
The 13.56 MHz Caveat: Frequency Alone Does Not Equal Security
A common misconception is that 13.56 MHz cards are inherently secure. The frequency enables mutual authentication and encrypted memory, but a reader that only reads the card’s serial number (CSN) without performing authentication is just as vulnerable as a 125 kHz system. The card’s encrypted capabilities are unused if the reader does not exercise them. Secure deployment requires both a secure credential and a reader configured to authenticate it.
The Second Attack Surface: NFC Relay Attacks
Cloning assumes the attacker obtains the credential’s secret material. Relay attacks bypass that requirement entirely: they extend the credential’s communication range without extracting its secrets.
How Relay Attacks Work
NFC and RFID proximity systems assume that a credential presented to a reader is physically close to it. A relay attack breaks that assumption by using two devices—one near the legitimate card, one near the legitimate reader—connected over a network link. The reader communicates with the real card through the relay, and authentication succeeds even though the card is hundreds of meters away.
Practical relay frameworks have matured. A 2024 paper presented a working relay attack on ISO/IEC 14443 systems using two NFC-enabled devices forwarding communication over a network channel. The relayprox tool was tested against access control using MIFARE DESFire EV1 and EV2—notably, when the “Proximity check” functionality was not used. A 2026 framework (HF_CARDHOPPER) tunnels ISO14443A communication over IP and explicitly targets access control reader bypass.
The implication is significant: even a DESFire credential can be relayed if the reader does not implement distance verification. Encryption protects the credential’s secrets; it does not prove that the credential is physically present.
Mitigation: Distance Bounding and Proximity Check
The primary countermeasure is distance bounding—a protocol that measures the round-trip time of a challenge-response exchange to establish an upper bound on the credential’s distance. A relay adds latency that a properly implemented distance-bounding protocol should detect.
The relevant standards are evolving. ISO/IEC 22369 (Distance Bounding) was under development as of 2025. DESFire EV2/EV3 readers can implement a “Proximity check” function; when enabled, relay attacks against DESFire become substantially more difficult.
The practical guidance for integrators is straightforward: when specifying DESFire, confirm that the reader is configured to perform mutual authentication and, where supported, proximity checking. A DESFire credential on a reader that only reads the CSN or does not perform distance verification provides less protection than its specification suggests.
The Video Intercom-Specific Risk: The Master Card
Video intercom systems often include a master card or admin card used to issue and revoke user credentials. If the master card is compromised, the entire access control system is compromised—not through cloning a single resident’s card, but through the authority to create new cards.
The 2026 CVE record includes a direct example. CVE-2026-85544 describes Hikvision intercom products that used an immutable factory value which could be obtained from the local network or through physical interaction, allowing an attacker to forge a legitimate main card and gain permission to issue cards. The affected models span multiple intercom product lines, and no firmware or hardware revision details were provided—meaning any current production unit could be susceptible. The issue was resolved by removing the main card function in fixed versions.
This case illustrates a design principle that extends beyond any single vendor: the master card function is a high-value target, and its security depends on how the master credential is generated, stored, and verified. A master card derived from a static factory value is a single point of failure. Systems that support master card functions should be evaluated for how that credential is protected—and whether the function can be disabled entirely if not needed.
A Layered Hardening Framework
No single measure secures access credentials. The following framework applies defense in depth across the credential, the reader, the system, and operations.
Layer 1: Credential Selection
For new deployments: Specify MIFARE DESFire EV2 or EV3 with site-specific keys. Do not accept a DESFire credential provisioned with default keys. Gallagher’s guidance classifies DESFire EV2/EV3 as “Very High” security and recommended for new sites, while MIFARE Classic and 125 kHz are not recommended.
For existing deployments: Identify the credential population. 125 kHz and MIFARE Classic credentials should be treated as legacy technologies with known cloning risk, not as secure access control. A migration plan is not optional—it is a risk management requirement.
For mobile credentials: NFC-based phone credentials using DESFire EV3 or equivalent secure element technology inherit the same security properties as the card, with the added benefit that the credential is tied to a device that can be remotely revoked.
Layer 2: Reader Configuration
- Enable mutual authentication. The reader must authenticate the card, not merely read its serial number.
- Enable proximity check / distance bounding where the reader and credential support it. This is the primary defense against relay attacks.
- Avoid CSN-only reading for any access decision. If the reader reads only the serial number, the credential’s cryptographic capabilities are unused.
- Use site-specific keys, not manufacturer defaults. The default key is public knowledge.
Layer 3: System Design
- Protect the master card function. If the intercom system supports a master card for credential issuance, confirm how the master credential is generated and whether it can be disabled. Where possible, manage credentials through the management center rather than a physical master card.
- Segregate credential populations. Contractor and temporary credentials should not share the same key space or permission scope as resident credentials.
- Implement audit logging. Record credential issuance, deletion, and access events. A cloned credential that is used will generate access events that can be correlated with the legitimate holder’s location.
- Support multi-factor authentication for high-security zones. Card plus PIN, or card plus biometric, raises the security level beyond any single credential technology.
Layer 4: Operational Discipline
- Delete lost or departed credentials promptly. The most common access control gap is not a cryptographic break—it is a card that remains active after the holder has left. Every day a departed resident’s card remains valid is a day the building’s access control is compromised by administrative inaction rather than technical failure.
- Maintain a credential inventory. Track which cards are issued to which units and how many per unit. A documented count makes it possible to identify unreturned cards.
- Review access logs for anomalies. Repeated failed attempts, access at unusual hours, or access by a credential that has been reported lost are indicators that warrant investigation.
Migration: From Legacy to Secure Credentials
A migration from 125 kHz or MIFARE Classic to DESFire EV2/EV3 is a project, not a purchase order. The practical path follows a phased approach.
Step 1: Inventory the installed base. Count readers by technology and count active credentials by type. The migration scope is determined by the larger of the two populations.
Step 2: Deploy multi-technology readers. Dual-frequency or multi-protocol readers allow the building to accept both legacy and new credentials during the transition, so residents are not locked out while the migration proceeds.
Step 3: Issue new credentials in phases. Start with the highest-security zones—server rooms, garage access, restricted areas—and move to general residential access as the population is converted.
Step 4: Reconfigure readers to reject legacy credentials once the conversion is complete. The legacy technology remains a vulnerability for as long as it is accepted.
Step 5: Retire legacy credentials and readers. A migration that leaves legacy readers in place has not reduced the attack surface; it has added a new one alongside the old one.
The cost of migration is real, and it is why legacy systems persist. But the cost of a credential compromise—a break-in, an insurance dispute, or a master card forgery that invalidates the building’s access control—is borne by the party that deferred the migration.
What to Ask a Video Intercom Supplier
Credential security is not solely a property of the card; it is a property of the system that reads it and the manufacturer that supports it. When evaluating a supplier, the questions that matter are specific:
- Which credential technologies does the system support, and which are recommended for new deployments?
- Does the reader perform mutual authentication with DESFire credentials, or does it read only the serial number?
- Is proximity checking / distance bounding supported to mitigate relay attacks?
- How is the master card or admin credential protected, and can the master card function be disabled?
- Are site-specific keys used for DESFire provisioning, or are default keys accepted?
- What audit logging is available for credential issuance, deletion, and access events?
- Does the system support multi-factor authentication (card plus PIN, or card plus biometric) for restricted zones?
- What is the migration path from legacy credentials to DESFire, and does the reader support multi-technology during the transition?
A supplier that can answer these with specifics—and provide model-specific documentation for the credential and reader combination—is a supplier whose system can be configured to resist the attacks described in this article.
FARHD’s intercom systems support card-based access control, and credential technology selection and reader configuration are specified per project. The 8″ apartment outdoor station and the D43 outdoor unit support card unlock alongside face recognition and other access methods, and the management center provides the credential issuance and deletion functions that operational discipline depends on. As with any access control deployment, the security outcome depends on the credential generation, the reader configuration, and the management practices applied—not on the intercom panel alone.
The Credential Is the Front Door
A video intercom system presents a polished interface to the visitor: a camera, a screen, a call button, a door release. But the access decision is made by the credential, and a credential that can be cloned in seconds or relayed from another location undermines every other layer of security in the building.
The generational divide is clear. 125 kHz is trivially clonable and should not be deployed where security matters. MIFARE Classic was compromised in 2008 and remains in widespread use, with real-world cloning incidents increasing and hardware backdoors discovered in compatible chips. DESFire EV2/EV3 is the secure baseline—but only when configured with site-specific keys, mutual authentication, and proximity checking where relay resistance is required. And the master card function deserves scrutiny, because compromising it compromises the entire system.
Secure the credential, configure the reader to authenticate it, protect the master card, and migrate away from legacy technology with discipline. The front door is only as strong as the card that opens it.
We look forward to building a strong partnership with you and jointly shaping the future of smart living.
Email: info@farhd.com
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Post time: Nov-19-2026